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Abstract—We investigate beamforming and artificial noise
generation at the secondary transmitters to establish secure
transmission in large scale spectrum sharing networks, where
multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers attempt to intercept the
secondary transmission. We develop a comprehensive analytical
framework to accurately assess the secrecy performance under
the primary users’ quality of service constraint. Our aim is
to characterize the impact of beamforming and artificial noise
generation (BF&AN) on this complex large scale network. We
first derive exact expressions for the average secrecy rate and
the secrecy outage probability. We then derive an easy-to-evaluate
asymptotic average secrecy rate and asymptotic secrecy outage
probability when the number of antennas at the secondary
transmitter goes to infinity. Our results show that the equal
power allocation between the useful signal and artificial noise
is not always the best strategy to achieve maximum average
secrecy rate in large scale spectrum sharing networks. Another
interesting observation is that the advantage of BF&AN over BF
on the average secrecy rate is lost when the aggregate interference
from the primary and secondary transmitters is strong, such that
it overtakes the effect of the generated AN.
Index Terms—Artificial noise, physical layer security, power
allocation, spectrum sharing networks, stochastic geometry.
I. INTRODUCTION
The sky-rocketing growth of multimedia infotainment ap-
plications and broadband-hungry mobile devices exacerbate
the stringent demand for ultra high data rate and services.
Such urgent demand is further driven by the exponential
growth of smartphones, tablets, machine-to-machine (M2M)
communication devices. To cope with this, unlicensed users
are allowed to transmit on the spectrum reserved for the wire-
less broadband devices as long as the quality of service (QoS)
of the primary network is satisfied [2, 3]. These networks are
often referred to as cognitive radio networks (CRNs).
The open and dynamic characteristics of CRNs have lead
to several new classes of security threats and challenges due
to opportunistic utilization of licensed channels [4]. There
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exists six major types of attacks at the physical layer of
CRNs, which are commonly known as primary user emulation,
objective function attack, learning attack, spectrum sensing
data falsification, jamming attack, and eavesdropping [5].
Among them, we focus on the eavesdropping attacks targeted
at the secondary users (SUs). In this case, the eavesdroppers
attempt to intercept and overhear the secondary transmission
without transmitting any signals.
Traditional security, which is achieved through the higher
layer cryptographic authentication and identification, becomes
expensive and vulnerable to attacks. Particularly, in the emerg-
ing large scale networks with high mobility terminals, the
implementation and management of higher-layer key distri-
bution face increasing challenges [6, 7]. In other words, the
establishment of the secret keys to achieve encrypted trans-
mission in large scale decentralized networks are even more
complicated and expensive than the point-to-point communi-
cations [7]. To cope with these issues, physical layer security
has been proposed as a complementary security method to
protect the confidential information from eavesdropping [8]. A
comprehensive overview of physical layer security in multiuser
wireless networks has been presented in [5].
Recently, physical layer security has been introduced into
large scale wireless networks with randomly located eaves-
droppers [9–11], single antenna legitimate nodes and eaves-
droppers [7], multiple jammers [12], and cellular users [13,
14]. In these works, the stochastic geometry and random
graphs were applied for modeling these networks [15]. This
mathematical tool is attractive since it captures the topological
randomness of these networks, and provides a simple and
tractable model for characterizing the performance [16].
Various advanced techniques have been developed to en-
hance the secrecy performance [17]. Beamforming (BF) is
proved to be the optimal transmission scheme to achieve the
maximum achievable secrecy rate in multiple input single
output (MISO) systems [18]. Generating artificial noise (AN)
at the legitimate transmitter is proposed to be an effective
technique to confound the eavesdroppers [19]. In the AN-
based method, the power allocation between the information-
bearing signal and the AN at the transmitter is critically
important, which reveals the tradeoff between enhancing the
main channel by increasing the power allocated to information-
bearing signal and degrading the eavesdropper’s channel by
allocating more power to the AN. In [20] and [21], the optimal
power allocation strategies were studied in the conventional
wireless network with fixed nodes, and wireless ad hoc net-
works with mobile nodes, respectively. However, all these
1
2works [18–22] have considered the physical layer security in
legacy networks.
Compared with the physical layer security in conventional
networks, there exist several major differences in the security
of CRNs: 1) the QoS requirement of the primary network
needs to be satisfied; 2) the SU receiver is subject to the
aggregate interference from the PU transmitters; and 3) the
secondary network is more susceptible to security threats. In
light of the aforementioned circumstances, the research on
enhancing the security at the physical layer of CRNs has
received increasing attentions. In [23–25], the secondary user
acts as a jammer to enhance the secrecy transmission of a
primary network. In [26], multiuser scheduling was proposed
to improve the security level of secondary transmission with
primary QoS constraint. In [27], it was demonstrated that
the best secrecy performance of secondary network can be
achieved when the perfect channel state information (CSI) of
all links are available. In [28], it was proved that beamforming
is the optimal transmission strategy to secure MISO CRN
with the perfect knowledge of all channels. The authors of
[28] then extended their work to the networks with imperfect
knowledge in [29]. In [30], the beamforming and artificial
noise generation (BF&AN) was adopted at the SU transmitter
to enhance the secrecy throughput of a multiple-input, single-
output, multieavesdropper (MISOME) primary network. Note
that [26–30] only considered fixed location nodes. In [31], the
secrecy capacity of cognitive radio networks with uniformly
distributed secondary transmitters and primary transmitters
was examined. In [32], the secrecy capacity of the primary
network was analyzed in CRNs, where PUs, SUs, and Eves
followed the mutually independent homogeneous Poisson pro-
cess.
Different from the aforementioned works, we treat the
secrecy performance of large scale spectrum sharing networks
with BF&AN at the SU transmitters. Compared against the
security of non-cognitive radio networks in [21], the prerequi-
site of underlay spectrum sharing networks is to guarantee
the QoS of the primary network. This can be fulfilled by
constraining the outage probability at the PU receiver below
a predetermined threshold (i.e., the peak allowable outage
probability). The use of BF&AN at the SU transmitter brings
array gains at the legitimate receiver and disrupts the reception
at the eavesdropper. Although BF&AN has been well treated
in the conventional physical layer security network in [20], no
work has considered BF&AN in large scale spectrum sharing
networks. Therefore, the question of how BF&AN impacts the
security design of such a complex network remains unknown.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
1) We derive a new exact closed-form expression for the
maximum permissive transmit power at the SU transmit-
ter with BF&AN. We accurately quantify the permissive
transmit power region where the primary network’s QoS
can be guaranteed, as presented in Theorem 1. We
derive the exact expressions for the average secrecy rate
and the secrecy outage probability of the secondary net-
work with BF&AN at the SU transmitters, as presented
in Theorems 2 and 3.
2) We show that there exists an average secrecy rate bound-
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Fig. 1. A realization of a large scale spectrum sharing network model
describing the received signal at a SU receiver. In this network, the green
square represents the PU transmitter, the diamond represents the PU receiver,
the triangle represents the SU transmitter, the circle represents the SU
receiver, and the red star represents the eavesdropper. The blue solid line
represents the secondary transmission, the green solid line represents the
primary transmission, the blue dashed line represents the interference from
the SU transmitter, and the green dashed line presents the interference from
the PU transmitter.
ary beyond which the PU receiver’s QoS is violated.
We reveal that the optimal power allocation factor for
maximizing the average secrecy rate varies for different
system parameters. Equal power allocation may not
achieve the near optimal average secrecy rate in large
scale spectrum sharing networks.
3) To provide insights into system design from an imple-
mentation viewpoint, we compare the average secrecy
rate of BF&AN with that of BF. We observe the same
average secrecy rate boundary for BF&AN and BF. The
advantage of BF&AN over BF on the average secrecy
rate is lost, when the aggregate interference from the PU
and SU transmitters is strong, such that it overtakes the
effect of the generated AN.
4) We derive the asymptotic average secrecy rate and the
asymptotic secrecy outage probability of the secondary
network with BF&AN at the SU transmitters when the
number of SU transmit antennas Ns goes to infinity, as
presented in Propositions 1, 2, and 3. Our asymptotic
results well predict the exact performance in the medium
and large Ns regime. We determine the antenna gap,
which showcases the number of additional antennas
required to achieve the same asymptotic average secrecy
rate in more dense networks.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODEL
We consider secure communication in an underlay spectrum
sharing network where the SU transmitters communicate with
the corresponding SU receivers under the potential malicious
attempt of multiple eavesdroppers. Each SU transmitter has
Ns antennas, and the remaining nodes in this model are all
single-antenna nodes. As shown in Fig. 1, we have a set of
PU transmitters, SU transmitters, and eavesdroppers locations,
denoted by Φp, Φs and Φe, in which Φp, Φs and Φe follow
3independent homogeneous Poisson point processes (HPPPs)
with densities λp, λs and λe, respectively. This model is prac-
tical and representative of the decentralized networks, where
the nodes are randomly deployed or have substantial mobility
[33]. We assume that each PU/SU transmitter communicates
with its unique associated intended PU/SU receiver at a fixed
distance, respectively, in order to simplify the analysis and
provide some design insights [21, 34, 35]. Note that this fixed
distance assumption can be relaxed by taking into account the
probability density distribution of the distance.
The wireless channels are modeled as independent quasi-
static Rayleigh fading. The eavesdroppers interpret the sec-
ondary transmitter’s signal without trying to modify it. In
this complex CRNs, we consider the interference-limited case
where the thermal noise is negligible compared with the
aggregate interference from the other transmitters. Similar as
[20, 21], we utilize the SIR to characterize the performance.
We mask the beamformed broadcast information with the
AN at the SU transmitters to confuse the eavesdroppers.
Each SU transmitter broadcasts the information-bearing sig-
nals and AN simultaneously. We assume that the perfect
CSI between each SU transmitter and each SU receiver are
available1. The AN is transmitted in the null space of the
intended SU receiver’s channel, thus imposing no effect on
the secondary channel, whereas degrading the eavesdropper’s
channel. We denote the intended channel vector between
the ith SU transmitter (i ∈ Φs) and the corresponding SU
receiver as hi,si ∈ C1×Ns , the channel state information
(CSI) of which is known at the ith SU transmitter. An
orthonormal basis of CNs×Ns is generated at the ith SU
transmitter as
[
h
†
i,si
/
‖hi,si‖, Gi,si
]
Ns×Ns
2
, where Gi,si is
a Ns × (Ns − 1) matrix. Note that each column of Gi,si and
h
†
i,si
/
‖hi,si‖ are mutually orthogonal. We define bi as the
information-bearing signal, and nA as the AN. The transmitted
BF&AN symbol vector is modeled as
xsi =
h
†
i,si
‖hi,si‖
bi +Gi,sinA, (1)
where E
{
bib
†
i
}
= δ2s , and Ns − 1 elements of nA are inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d) complex Gaussian
random variables with zero mean and variance σ2n. Thus,
the total transmit power per transmission Ps is given by
Ps = PI + PA, where the power allocated to the information
signal is PI = σ2s and the power allocated to the AN is
PA = (Ns − 1)σ2n. We also define µ as the fraction of power
assigned to the information signal, thus PI = µPs .
In the primary network, we assume the typical PU receiver
is located at the origin of the coordinate system, and the
distance between the typical PU transmitter and its associated
PU receiver is rp. According to the Slivnyak’s theorem [36],
adding a probe point to the HPPP at an arbitrary location does
not affect the law of the point process. The received SIR at
1In practice, perfect CSI may not be easy to obtained, as such, our analysis
provides the upper bound on the actual achievable secrecy performance.
2† is the conjugate transpose operator.
the typical PU receiver is given by
γ
p,AN
SIR
=
|hp0 |2rp−α
Ip,p0 + P
−1
p Is,p0
, (2)
where
Ip,p0 =
∑
j∈Φp\{0}
|hj,p0 |2|Xj,p0 |−α, (3)
and
Is,p0 =
∑
i∈Φs
[
σ2s
∣∣hi,p0 h
†
i,si∥∥∥h†i,si
∥∥∥
∣∣2 + σ2n∥∥hi,p0Gi,si∥∥2]∣∣Xi,p0∣∣−α.
(4)
In (2), α is the path-loss exponent, hp0 is the channel fading
gain between the typical PU transmitter and the typical PU
receiver, hj,p0 and |Xj,p0 | are the interfering channel fading
gain and distance between the jth PU transmitter and the
typical PU receiver, respectively. hi,p0 ∈ C1×Ns and |Xi,p0 |
are the interfering channel vector and distance between the ith
SU transmitter and the typical PU receiver, respectively. Pp is
the transmit power at the PU transmitter. Note that PpIp,p0
is the interference from other PU transmitters to the typical
PU receiver, Is,p0 is the co-channel interference from the SU
transmitters to the typical PU receiver.
In the secondary network, we assume h0,s0 ∈ C1×Ns and
rs to be the channel vector and distance between the typical
SU transmitter and corresponding typical SU receiver. Note
that each SU transmitter transmits the signal vector expressed
as (1), we obtain the effective signal at the typical SU receiver
as
h0,s0xs0 = h0,s0
h
†
0,s0
‖h0,s0‖
b0 + h0,s0G0,s0nA = ‖h0,s0‖b0.
(5)
The received SIR at the typical SU receiver is given by
γ
s,AN
SIR
=
σ2s‖h0,s0‖2rs−α
Is,s0 + PpIp,s0
, (6)
where
Ip,s0 =
∑
j∈Φp
|hj,s0 |2|Xj,s0 |−α, (7)
and
Is,s0 =
∑
i∈Φs\{0}
[
σ2s
∣∣hi,s0 h
†
i,si∥∥∥h†i,si
∥∥∥
∣∣2 + σ2n∥∥hi,s0Gi,si∥∥2]
∣∣Xi,s0 ∣∣−α. (8)
In (6), hj,s0 and |Xj,s0 | are the channel fading gain and
distance between the jth PU transmitter and the typical SU
receiver, respectively. hi,s0 ∈ C1×Ns and |Xi,s0 | are the
interfering channel vector and distance between the ith SU
transmitter and the typical SU receiver, respectively. Note that
PpIp,s0 is the co-channel interference from the PU transmitters
to the typical SU receiver, and Is,s0 is the aggregate interfer-
ence from other SU transmitters to the typical SU receiver.
4In the eavesdropping channel, we consider the most detri-
mental eavesdropper that has the highest SIR for a typical SU
transmitter [37]. Note that eavesdroppers are only interested
in the secondary transmissions, and interpret the primary
transmissions as interference3. We assume h0,ek ∈ C1×Ns to
be the channel vector between the typical SU transmitter and
an arbitrary eavesdropper ek ∈ Φe. With BF&AN at the SU
transmitter, the received signal from the typical SU transmitter
at the kth eavesdropper is given by
h0,ekxs0 = h0,ek
h
†
0,s0
‖h0,s0‖
b0 + h0,ekG0,s0nA, (9)
where the first part is the useful received information signal,
and the second part is the received AN. As such, the SIR at
the most detrimental eavesdropper is expressed as
γ
e,AN
SIR
= max
ek∈Φe


σ2s
∣∣h0,ek h†0,s0‖h†0,s0‖
∣∣2|Xek |−α
Is,ek + PpIp,ek + σ
2
nIs0,ek,an

 , (10)
where
Ip,ek =
∑
j∈Φp
|hj,ek |2|Xj,ek |−α, (11)
Is,ek =
∑
i∈Φs\{0}
[
σ2s
∣∣hi,ek h
†
i,si∥∥∥h†i,si
∥∥∥
∣∣2 + σ2n∥∥hi,ekGi,si∥∥2]
|Xi,ek |−α, (12)
and
Is0,ek,an = ‖h0,ekG0,s0‖2|Xek |−α. (13)
Note that hj,ek and |Xj,ek | are the channel fading gain
and distance between the jth PU transmitter and the kth
eavesdropper, respectively. hi,ek ∈ C1×Ns and |Xi,ek | are the
channel vector and distance between the ith SU transmitter
and the kth eavesdropper, respectively. |Xek | is the distance
between the typical SU transmitter and the kth eavesdropper.
It is known that PpIp,ek is the aggregate interference from
PU transmitters, σ2nIs0,ek,an is the AN from the typical SU
transmitter, and Is,ek is the aggregate interference from other
SU transmitters.
We now define
Wsi,z = σ
2
s
∣∣hi,z h†i,si∥∥∥h†i,si
∥∥∥
∣∣2 + σ2n∥∥hi,zGi,si∥∥2, (14)
where hi,si is the intended channel, hi,z is the channel
between the ith SU transmitter and the non-intended receiver
z (except for the ith SU receiver), and z ∈ {p0, d0,ek}.
To facilitate the performance analysis, we derive the Laplace
transform of the aggregate interference from the SU transmit-
ters Is,z =
∑
i∈Φs
Wsi,z|Xi,z|−α in (2), (6), and (10) as the
following lemma.
3This assumption is practical since the primary networks operate in the
Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) spectrum and broadcast the public service
to households, which do not have any confidential messages.
Lemma 1. The Laplace transform of the interference from the
SU transmitters with BF&AN to the non-intended receiver Is,z
is derived as
LIs,z (s) =


exp
(
−λspiP
2
α
s Υ1Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
s
2
α
)
µ 6= 1
Ns
,
exp
(
−λspi(µPs)
2
αΓ
(
Ns +
2
α
) Γ(1− 2α )
Γ(Ns)
s
2
α
)
µ = 1
Ns
,
(15)
where
Υ1 =
(
1− (1− µ)
(Ns − 1)µ
)1−Ns[
µ
2
αΓ
(
1 +
2
α
)− 1
µ((1− µ)
Ns − 1
)1+ 2α Ns−2∑
k=0
(
1− (1− µ)
(Ns − 1)µ
)kΓ (k + 1 + 2
α
)
Γ (k + 1)
]
.
(16)
Proof: See Appendix A.
III. EXACT SECRECY PERFROMANCE
In this section, we first present the SU’s permissive transmit
power region. We then present the exact expressions for the
average secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability in
large scale spectrum sharing networks with BF&AN at the SU
transmitters. To obtain key insights through a comparison of
BF&AN with BF, we derive exact expressions for the average
secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability in large scale
spectrum sharing networks with BF at the SU transmitters.
A. Beamforming and Artificial Noise Generation
1) PUs’ Quality of Service Requirement: According to the
rule of underlay spectrum sharing networks, the concurrent
transmission of PUs and SUs occurs under the prerequisite that
the QoS requirement of the primary transmission is satisfied
[38]. As such, we first examine the transmit power operating
region at the SU transmitters under the primary network’s
QoS constraint. The QoS of primary network is characterized
that the outage probability should be no larger than the peak
allowable value ρpout, which is expressed as [39]
P
{p}
out = Pr
{
γ
p,AN
SIR
< γ
{p}
th
}
< ρ
{p}
out , (17)
where γ{p}th is the desired SIR threshold at the PU receiver.
In the following theorem, we present the SU’s permissive
transmit power region.
Theorem 1. With BF&AN at the SU transmitter, the permis-
sive transmit power region at the SU transmitter is given as
Ps ∈ (0, Pmaxs ], where
Pmaxs =


(
− ΘΥ1λs
)α
2
Pp µ 6= 1Ns(
− ΘΓ(Ns)
λsΓ(Ns+ 2α )
)α
2 Pp
µ
µ = 1
Ns
,
(18)
where Υ1 is given by (16), and
Θ =
ln
(
1− ρ{p}out
))
piΓ
(
1− 2
α
) (
γ
{p}
th
) 2
α
rp2
+ λpΓ
(
1 +
2
α
)
. (19)
5Proof: See Appendix B.
The following are some observations from (18).
• For the fixed primary network’s QoS constraint, the maxi-
mum permissive transmit power at the SU transmitter can
be relaxed by reducing the distance of the typical PU
transceivers rp, due to the fact that the PU can tolerate
more interference from the SU transmitters.
• With increasing number of SU nodes and PU nodes per
unit area, the transmit power constraint imposed on the
SU transmitter is more severe. This is due to the increas-
ing aggregate interference from the SU transmitters and
the other interfering PU transmitters.
To study the impact of BF&AN on the secrecy performance
within the permissive transmit power region, we consider two
important metrics: the average secrecy rate and the secrecy
outage probability.
2) Average Secrecy Rate: The instantaneous secrecy rate is
defined as [37]
Rse = [log2
(
1 + γs,AN
SIR
)− log2 (1 + γe,ANSIR )]+. (20)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}. Here, γe,AN
SIR
= max
ek∈Φe
{
γ
ek,AN
SIR
}
corresponds to the non-colluding eavesdropping case [40].
The average secrecy rate is the average of the instantaneous
secrecy rate Rse over γs,ANSIR and γ
e,AN
SIR
. As such, the average
secrecy rate is given by [41]
R¯se =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Rsefγs,AN
SIR
(x1) fγe,AN
SIR
(x2)dx1dx2
=
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
F
γ
e,AN
SIR
(x2)
1 + x2
(
1− F
γ
s,AN
SIR
(
x2
))
dx2. (21)
In order to examine the average secrecy rate, we derive the
CDFs of SIRs at the typical SU receiver and the most detri-
mental eavesdropper in the following Lemma 2 and Lemma
3, respectively.
Lemma 2. With BF&AN at the SU transmitters, the CDF of
SIR at the typical SU receiver is derived as
F
{s}
γ
s,AN
SIR
(
γ
{s}
th
)
= 1− exp (−Λl(γ{s}th ) 2α r2s)−
Ns−1∑
m=1
(rαs )
m
m!(−1)m∑ m!
m∏
i=1
mi!i!mi
exp
(−Λl(γ{s}th ) 2α r2s)
m∏
j=1
((−Λl(γ{s}th ) 2α )(rs)2−jα
j−1∏
k=0
( 2
α
− k))
mj
, (22)
where
Λl =
{
Λ2 µ =
1
Ns
Λ3 µ 6= 1Ns .
(23)
In (23), Λ2 and Λ3 are given by
Λ2 =pi
(
λs
Γ
(
Ns +
2
α
)
Γ
(
Ns
) + λpΓ(1 + 2
α
)(
µ
Ps
Pp
)− 2α)
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
,
(24)
Λ3 = pi
(
λpΓ
(
1 +
2
α
)(Ps
Pp
)− 2
α + λsΥ1
)
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
(µ)
− 2
α ,
(25)
respectively. Here,
m∑
i=1
i ·mi = m, and Υ1 is given by (16),
and Ps is the maximum permissive transmit power, which is
given in (18).
Proof: See Appendix C.
Based on the SIR at the most detrimental eavesdropper in
(10), we derive the CDF for γe,AN
SIR
in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. With BF&AN at the SU transmitters, the CDF of
SIR at the most detrimental eavesdropper is derived as
F
{e}
γ
e,AN
SIR
(
γ
{e}
th
)
=
exp
(
−piλe
Λl
(
γ
{e}
th
)− 2
α
( 1− µ(
Ns − 1
)
µ
γ
{e}
th + 1
)1−Ns)
,
(26)
where Λl is given in (23). Note that Ps is the maximum
permissive transmit power, which is given in (18).
Proof: See Appendix D.
Different from [7] and [21] where only the approximation
or bound on CDF of SIR at the eavesdropper was derived, our
result is derived in a simple exact closed-form expression. It
is observed from (26) that the CDF of γe,AN
SIR
is an increasing
function of λs and λp, and a decreasing function of λe.
By substituting the CDF of γs,AN
SIR
in (22) and the CDF of
γ
e,AN
SIR
in (26) into (21), we derive the average secrecy rate in
the following theorem.
Theorem 2. With BF&AN at the SU transmitters, the average
secrecy rate is derived as
R¯se,AN =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
exp(−piλeΛl x2−
2
α ( 1−µ(Ns−1)µx2 + 1)
1−Ns
)
1 + x2
exp
(−Λlx2 2α r2s)[1 +
Ns−1∑
m=1
(rαs )
m
m!
(−1)m
∑
m!
m∏
j=1
((−Λlx2 2α )(rs)2−jα
j−1∏
k=0
( 2
α
− k))
mj
mj !j!mj
]
dx2,
(27)
where Λl is given in (23). Here, Ps is the maximum permissive
transmit power, which is given in (18).
Note that the average secrecy rate given in (27) is applicable
to arbitrary Ns, µ and α.
3) Secrecy Outage Probability: The secrecy outage is de-
clared when the instantaneous secrecy rate Rse is less than
the expected secrecy rate Rs. As such, the secrecy outage
probability is defined as [41]
Pout (Rs) = Pr (Rse < Rs)
=
∫ ∞
0
f
γ
e,AN
SIR
(x2)Fγs,AN
SIR
(
2Rs (1+x2)− 1
)
dx2. (28)
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Fig. 2. Average secrecy rate of a large scale spectrum sharing network with
the transmit power adaptation scheme. Parameters: λe = λp = 10−4 m−2,
λs = 10−3 m−2, α = 4, rp = 15 m, rs = 10 m, Pp = 36 dBm, and
γ
{p}
th
= 0 dBm.
By substituting the probability density function (PDF) of
γ
e,AN
SIR
and CDF of γs,AN
SIR
into (28), we derive the secrecy
outage probability in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. With BF&AN at the SU transmitters, the secrecy
outage probability is derived as
Pout,AN (Rs) =
∫ ∞
0
piλex2
− 2
α
(
2
α
x2
−1
(
1−µ
(Ns−1)µ
x2 + 1
)
+ 1
)
Λl
(
1−µ
(Ns−1)µ
x2 + 1
)Ns
exp
(−piλe
Λl
x2
− 2
α
( 1− µ
(Ns − 1)µx2 + 1
)1−Ns)[
1−
exp
(−Λ3(2Rs(1+x2)− 1) 2α r2s)(1 +
Ns−1∑
m=1
(
rαs
)m
m!
(−1)m
∑
m!
m∏
j=1
((−Λl(2Rs(1+x2)− 1)
2
α )(rs)
2−jα
j−1∏
k=0
( 2
α
− k))
mj
mj !j!mj
)]
dx2,
(29)
where Λl is given in (23). Here, Ps is the maximum permissive
transmit power, which is given in (18).
B. Numerical Examples for BF & AN
1) Average Secrecy Rate Boundary
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 plot the average secrecy rate of
large scale underlay spectrum sharing networks under
the primary network’s QoS constraint ρ{p}out = 0.15
with the transmit power adaptation scheme. From these
figures, we see that the exact analytical curves are well
validated by Monte Carlo simulations. The solid lines
represent the operational achievable average secrecy rate
where the primary network’s QoS constraint is always
satisfied, i.e., P pri,ANout
(
γ
{p}
th
) ≤ 0.15. The dashed lines
represent the unachievable average secrecy rate where
the primary network’s QoS constraint is violated, i.e.,
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Fig. 3. Average secrecy rate of a large scale spectrum sharing network
with the transmit power adaptation scheme. Parameters: λe = 10−4 m−2,
Ns = 6, α = 4, rp = 15 m, rs = 10 m, µ = 0.8, Pp = 36 dBm, and
γ
{p}
th
= 0 dBm.
P
pri,AN
out
(
γ
{p}
th
)
> 0.15. We named the solid line as
“average secrecy rate boundary”.
2) Impact of Ns and µ on the average secrecy rate
Fig. 2 plots the average secrecy rate versus the SU’s
transmit power with various number of transmit antennas
Ns at the SU and power allocation factor µ, and we con-
sider the same density for PUs, SUs, and eavesdroppers.
The exact analytical curves are obtained from (27). We
find that for fixed µ = 0.4, the average secrecy rate
increases with increasing Ns.
3) Impact of λs and λp on the average secrecy rate
Fig. 3 plots the average secrecy rate versus Ps for
various densities of PUs and SUs. We observe that there
is a shift of the “average secrecy rate wall” to the left
with increasing the density of PUs and SUs. This can be
predicted from (18) that Pmaxs is a decreasing function
of λp and λs. As expected, the average secrecy rate
decreases with increasing the density of SUs and PUs,
due to the increased aggregate interference from the SUs
and the PUs.
4) Optimal µ for the average secrecy rate
Fig. 4 plots the average secrecy rate versus µ for
various densities of eavesdroppers λe. Here, we use
the maximum permissive transmit power to transmit the
signal from SU, which is given by (27), and we set
Ps = P
max
s and ρ
{p}
out = 0.1. The triangles represent
the maximum achievable average secrecy rate. For the
scenarios where the density of eavesdroppers is higher
than the density of SUs, the average secrecy rate first in-
creases and then decreases with increasing µ. An optimal
power allocation factor µ∗ exists at which the maximum
average secrecy rate is achieved. For the region µ < µ∗,
we see that increasing the power allocated to the useful
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Fig. 4. Average secrecy rate of a large scale spectrum sharing network.
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signal ensures more message delivery (increasing Csu)
and plays a dominant role in improving the average
secrecy rate; for the region µ > µ∗, reducing the power
allocated to the AN increases CE, and thus degrades the
average secrecy rate. We conclude that a tradeoff exists
between increasing the capacity of secondary channel
and decreasing the capacity of eavesdropping channel.
Interestingly, we see from Fig. 4 that µ∗ varies for
different λe. We find that less power should be allocated
to the AN for a network with less dense eavesdroppers.
Out of expectation, the equal power allocation may not
be a good strategy to achieve the maximum average
secrecy rate.
5) Impact of density ratio on the optimal µ
To better illustrate the relationship between the optimal
power allocation factor and the density of SUs and
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Fig. 6. Secrecy outage probability versus µ for various Ns and α. Parameters:
ρ
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−4 m−2, λp = 10−4 m−2, λs = 10−3 m−2, rp =
6 m, rs = 3 m, NS = 6, Rs = 1, Pp = 15 dBm, and γ
{p}
th
= 0 dBm.
eavesdroppers. We first define the ratio between λe and
λs as ε = λe/λs. In Fig. 5, we plot µ∗ versus the density
ratio ε. We set Ps = Pmaxs , λs = 10−3 m−2, and
λp = 10
−4 m−2. We find that 1) The power allocated
to AN should be increased with increasing the density
ratio between the eavesdroppers and the SUs ε to achieve
the optimal average secrecy rate; 2) For extremely low
density ratio ε, all of the power should be allocated
to information signal without injecting AN to achieve
the maximum average secrecy rate. This reveals that
improving the information delivery is more important
than combating the eavesdropping in this scenario.
6) Impact of Ns and α on the secrecy outage probability
Fig. 6 plots the secrecy outage probability versus µ
for various number of antennas at SU transmitter Ns.
The exact analytical curves are obtained from (29),
which are well validated by Monte Carlo simulations.
We assume Ps = Pmaxs . In this setting, we see that
the secrecy outage probability decreases with increasing
µ, and when µ approaches 1, the lowest secrecy outage
probability is achieved. This is because when the density
of eavesdroppers is small compared to that of SU, the
effect of delivering information overtakes the effect of
combating the eavesdropping. As expected, the secrecy
outage probability decreases with increasing Ns, which
is due to the array gains brought by additional antennas.
C. Numerical examples for the comparison between BF&AN
and BF
In this subsection, we compare the secrecy performance
of our proposed network with BF&AN to that with BF,
and examine the potential benefits of AN on the secrecy
performance. Note that BF can be viewed as a special case
of BF&AN with µ = 1.
In Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(b), we plot the operational achievable
average secrecy rate region for the large scale spectrum sharing
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Fig. 7. Comparison of average secrecy rate versus Ps and Pp between
BF&AN and BF.
network with BF&AN and BF. We see the same permissive
transmit power region for BF&AN and BF in each figure.
This is because, from the typical PU receiver’s perspective,
both AN and the information signal transmitted from SU are
viewed as interference, which is equivalent to the case of
BF. In both figures, we notice that the same unachievable
average secrecy rate region located in Ps ∈ (0, 30) dBm with
Pp ∈ (0,−30) dBm. This can be explained by the fact that
the QoS constraint is severely violated in this setting when the
aggregate interference is much higher compared to the useful
signal received at PU.
In contrast to the fact that it is often beneficial to emit AN
on top of the information-bearing signal in the physical layer
security model with fixed nodes [42], we see from Fig. 7(a)
that BF outperforms BF&AN or has the same performance as
BF&AN in all operational region. This is because the strong
aggregate interference from the PUs overtakes the effect of
the AN generated by SU. In this case, more power needs to
be allocated to transmit information signal at SUs to contend
with the interference from PUs. Interestingly, Fig. 7(b) shows
that BF&AN outperforms BF in some regions, owing to the
fact that the effect of AN generated by SU overtakes the
relatively low aggregate interference from PUs. In this case,
more power should be allocated to transmit AN to disrupt the
eavesdropping.
IV. LARGE ANTENNA ARRAYS ANALYSIS
In this section, we study the asymptotic secrecy performance
of the large scale spectrum sharing networks where the SU
transmitters are equipped with large antenna arrays. We ex-
amine the asymptotic behavior of the average secrecy rate and
the secrecy outage probability, when the number of antennas
at the SU transmitters goes to infinity.
We first present the Lemma 4 based on the law of large
numbers as follows:
Lemma 4. lim
Ns→∞
‖hz‖2 = Ns, and lim
Ns→∞
‖hi,zGi,si‖2 =
Ns − 1.
Proof: This is due to the fact
that ‖hz‖2∼Gamma (Ns, 1) and
‖hi,zGi,si‖2∼Gamma (Ns − 1, 1).
By using Lemma 4, we rewrite the SIR at the typical PU
in (2) as
γ
p,∞
SIR
d∼ |hp0 |
2
rp
−α
Ip,p0 + ηIs,p0,∞
, (30)
where
Ip,p0 =
∑
j∈Φp\{0}
|hj,p0 |2|Xj,p0 |−α (31)
and
Is,p0,∞ =
∑
i∈Φs
[
µ
∣∣hi,p0 h
†
i,si∥∥h†i,si∥∥
∣∣2 + (1− µ)]∣∣Xi,p0 ∣∣−α.
(32)
For large Ns, the SIR at typical SU is given as
γ
s,∞
SIR
d∼ µNsrs
−α
Is,s0,∞ + η
−1Ip,s0
, (33)
where
Ip,s0 =
∑
j∈Φp
|hj,s0 |2|Xj,s0 |−α (34)
and
Is,s0,∞ =
∑
i∈Φs\{0}
[
µ
∣∣hi,s0 h
†
i,si∥∥∥h†i,si
∥∥∥
∣∣2 + (1− µ)]|Xi,si |−α.
(35)
From (33), we find that the received SIR at typical SU scale
by Ns.
For large Ns, the SIR at the most detrimental eavesdropper
is given as
γ
e,∞
SIR
= max
ek∈Φe
{γek,∞
SIR
} , (36)
where
γ
ek,∞
SIR
d∼
µ
∣∣h0,ek h†i,si∥∥
∥h
†
i,si
∥
∥
∥
∣∣2|Xek |−α
Is0,ek,∞ + η
−1Ip,ek + (1− µ) |Xek |−α
, (37)
9where
Ip,ek =
∑
j∈Φp
|hj,ek |2|Xj,ek |−α (38)
and
Is0,ek,∞ =
∑
i∈Φs\{0}
[
µ
∣∣∣∣∣∣hi,ek
h
†
i,si∥∥∥h†i,si
∥∥∥
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ (1− µ)
]
|Xi,ek |−α.
(39)
Based on the SIR at the typical PU in (30), with the help of
the Laplace transform in [43, eq. (8)], and similar method
provided in the proof for the Theorem 1, we present the
permissive transmit power region at the SU transmitter at large
Ns in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. With BF&AN at the SU transmitters, the
permissive transmit power region for the SU transmitter at
large Ns is given as Ps ∈ (0, Pmaxs ], where
Pmaxs =
[
−Θ(∫ ∞
0
(
µt+
(
1− µ)) 2α e−tdt)−1λs−1]α2 Pp,
(40)
and Θ is given by (19).
To facilitate the analysis of the average secrecy rate and the
secrecy outage probability, we need to first derive the asymp-
totic CDFs of γe,∞
SIR
and γs,∞
SIR
. Using the method presented in
Appendix B, we derive the asymptotic CDF of γe,∞
SIR
given in
(36) as
Fγe,∞
SIR
(
γ
{e}
th
)
= exp
(
−piλee
(
1−µ−1
)
γ
{e}
th
ΞΓ
(
1− 2
α
) ( µPs
γ
{e}
th Pp
) 2α)
, (41)
where
Ξ = λpΓ
(
1 +
2
α
)
+ λs
(Ps
Pp
) 2
α
∫ ∞
0
(
µt+
(
1− µ)) 2α e−tdt.
(42)
To derive the asymptotic CDF of γs,∞
SIR
, we first present
Fγs,∞
SIR
(γsth) =
∫ ∞
µNs
γs
th
rs0
α
fIsec,∞ (x) dx, (43)
where
Isec,∞ =µ
∑
i∈Φs\
{
0
}
∣∣hi,s0 h
†
i,si∥∥h†i,si∥∥
∣∣2∣∣Xi,si ∣∣−α + (1− µ)
∑
i∈Φs\{0}
|Xi,si |−α +
(Ps
Pp
)−1∑
j∈Φp
|hj,s0 |2|Xj,s0 |−α.
(44)
In (43), fIsec,∞ (x) is the inverse Laplace transform
of LIsec,∞ (s), which can be expressed as fIsec,∞ (x) =
L−1Isec,∞ (s). Due to the intractability of this inverse Laplace
transform, some alternative ways have been proposed, such
as using numerical inversion to evaluate L−1Isec,∞ (s) [44],
or the log-normal approximations to approximate fIsec,∞ (x).
However, in our case, there exists singularity at |Xi,si | =
|Xj,s0 | = 0, thus the mean and variance of Isec,∞ derived
from the moment generating function diverge [14, 45], which
renders the derivation of the PDF of Isec,∞. Alternatively, we
utilize the Gil-Pelaez theorem [46] to facilitate the derivation
of the asymptotic CDF of SIR at the typical SU in the
following lemma.
Lemma 5. With BF&AN at the SU transmitters, the asymp-
totic CDF of SIR at the typical SU at large Ns is given as
Fγs,∞
SIR
(
γsth
)
= 1− FIsec,∞
( µNs
γsthrs0
α
)
=
1
2
+
1
pi
∫ ∞
0
Im
[
e
− jwµNs
γs
th
rs0
α
ϕ∗ (w)
]
w
dw, (45)
where FIsec,∞ (x) is the CDF of Isec,∞, j =
√
(−1), and
ϕ (w) is the conjugate of the characteristic function, which is
given by
ϕ
(
w
)
=exp
(−piΞΓ(1− 2
α
)
η−
2
α
(
jw
) 2
α
)
. (46)
Since we can not derive the closed form expression for the
general form for the PDF of Isec,∞, we present the special case
for the path loss component α = 4. In the following corollary,
we derive the asymptotic CDF of SIR for the typical secondary
user with α = 4.
Corollary 1. With BF&AN at the SU transmitters and α = 4,
the asymptotic CDF of SIR at the typical SU is derived as
F∞
γ
s,AN
SIR
(
γsth
)
= Φ
(piΞ
2
√
piγsthrs0
α
µNs
)
, (47)
where
Φ (x) =
1√
pi
∫ x2
0
e−t√
t
dt. (48)
Note that our derived asymptotic CDF of SIR at the typical
SU for α = 4 is in exact closed-form.
A. Average Secrecy Rate
Based on the CDF of SIR at the most detrimental eaves-
droppers in (41) and the CDF of SIR at the typical SU in (45),
we derive the general case of the asymptotic average secrecy
rate using (21) in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. With BF&AN at the SU transmitters, the
asymptotic average secrecy rate at large Ns is derived as
C¯∞se =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + x2
exp
(−piλee
(
1−µ−1
)
x2
ΞΓ
(
1− 2
α
) ( µPs
x2Pp
) 2α )[1
2
− 1
pi
∫ ∞
0
Im[
(exp(−piΞΓ(1− 2
α
)(Ps
Pp
)
− 2
α (jw)
2
α ))∗
e
jwµNs
x2rs0
α
]
1
w
dw
]
dx2.
(49)
Having (41) and (47), we derive the asymptotic average
secrecy rate for the special case of α = 4 in the following
corollary.
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Corollary 2. With BF&AN at the SU transmitters and α = 4,
the asymptotic average secrecy rate at large Ns is derived as
C¯∞se =
1
ln 2
∫ ∞
0
1
1 + x2
exp
(−piλee
(
1−µ−1
)
x2
ΞΓ
(
1− 2
α
) ( µ
x2
) 2α )
(
1− Φ(piΞ
2
√
pix2
µNsrs0
−α
))
dx2. (50)
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
We then turn our attention to the asymptotic secrecy outage
probability. We take the derivative of the asymptotic CDF
of SIR at the most detrimental eavesdroppers in (41), and
substitute it with the asymptotic CDF of SIR at the typical SU
in (47) into (28), to yield the general case of the asymptotic
secrecy outage probability in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. With BF&AN at the SU transmitters, the
asymptotic secrecy outage probability at large Ns is derived
as
P∞out,AN
(
Rs
)
=∫ ∞
0
piλe(µPs/Pp)
2
α
ΞΓ(1 − 2
α
)x2
2
α
exp(−piλee
(1−µ−1)x2
ΞΓ(1− 2
α
)
(
µPs
x2Pp
)
2
α
)
e
(
1−µ−1
)
x2
((
1− µ−1)− (− 2
α
)
x2
−1
)[1
2
+
1
pi∫ ∞
0
Im[
(exp(−piΞΓ(1− 2
α
)(Ps/Pp)
− 2
α (jw)
2
α ))∗
e
jwµNs
(2Rs (1+x2)−1)rs0
α
]
1
w
dw
]
dx2. (51)
Based on (47), we derive the secrecy outage probability for
α = 4 as a special case in the following corollary.
Corollary 3. With BF&AN at the SU transmitters and α =
4, the asymptotic secrecy outage probability at large Ns is
derived as
P∞out,AN
(
Rs
)
=∫ ∞
0
piλeµ
2
α
ΞΓ
(
1− 2
α
) exp (−piλee
(
1−µ−1
)
x2
ΞΓ
(
1− 2
α
) ( µ
x2
) 2α )
x2
− 2
α e
(
1−µ−1
)
x2
((
1− µ−1)− (− 2
α
)
x2
−1
)
Φ
(piΞ
2
√
pi
(
2Rs
(
1+x2
)− 1)
µNsrs0
−α
)
dx2. (52)
C. Numerical examples for the asymptotic secrecy perfor-
mance of BF&AN
Fig. 8 plots the asymptotic average secrecy rate of large
scale spectrum sharing networks with BF&AN for various
power allocation factor µ and λs. We assume Ps = Pmaxs .
The analytical results of asymptotic secrecy rate plotted using
(49) are in precise agreement with the simulation points of
asymptotic secrecy rate. It is also shown that the asymptotic
average secrecy rate converges to the exact average secrecy
rate at large Ns.
We observe that the average secrecy rate increases with
increasing Ns. This can be indicated by (33) that the received
SIR at the typical SU proportionally increases with µNs. For
the same µ, to achieve the same average secrecy rate, there
exists antenna gaps between the curves with different density
of SU. This antenna gap quantifies how many additional
antennas needed to be employed at the SU transmitter to
achieve the same average secrecy rate when the network
double its density of SU.
Fig. 9 plots the asymptotic secrecy outage probability versus
Ns. The analytical results of asymptotic outage probability
plotted using (51) are in precise agreement with the simulation
points of asymptotic outage probability. Furthermore, the
asymptotic secrecy outage probability converges to the exact
secrecy outage probability at large Ns. We see that the secrecy
outage probability decreases with increasing Ns, due to the
increase of the array gains at the SU receiver. We also see
that the secrecy outage probability decreases with increasing
µ, which reflects that for the scenario with relatively less dense
eavesdroppers, more power should be allocated to transmit
useful information to the SU receiver for the information
delivery enhancement.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered secure communication in large
scale spectrum sharing networks in the presence of multiple
non-colluding eavesdroppers. We employed beamforming and
artificial noise generation (BF&AN) at the SU transmitters to
achieve secure transmission against malicious eavesdroppers.
We obtained an exact expression for the average secrecy rate,
through which we observed the average secrecy rate boundary.
We also derived an exact expression for the secrecy outage
probability. Interestingly, our results show that to achieve the
optimal average secrecy rate, more power should be allocated
11
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to AN with increasing the density ratio between the eavesdrop-
pers and the SUs; whereas for extremely low density ratio, all
of the power should be allocated to information signal without
injecting AN. Moreover, we derived the asymptotic average
secrecy rate and the asymptotic secrecy outage probability as
the number of antennas at the SU transmitters grows large to
showcase the large gain brought to the secrecy performance.
APPENDIX A
A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Consider a HPPP Φs with density λs, the aggregate inter-
ference from the SU transmitters is given by
Is,z =
∑
i∈Φs
Wsi,z|Xi,z|−α. (A.1)
The Laplace transform of Is,z is
LIs,z (s) =E
(∏
i∈Φs
EWsi,z
(
exp
(
−sWsi,z|Xi,z|−α
)))
.
(A.2)
Applying the Generating functional of HPPP in [36] and the
polar-coordinate system, we have
LIs,z (s) = exp
(
−λspiE
[
W
2
α
si,z
]
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)
s
2
α
)
. (A.3)
Then we turn our attention to derive the expectation of
Wsi,z . According to [47] and [21],
∣∣∣h0,z h†i,si∥∥
∥h
†
i,si
∥
∥
∥
∣∣∣2∼Exp (1),
and ‖hi,zGi,si‖2 ∼ Gamma (Ns − 1, 1). Thus, we have
the PDF distribution of Wsi,z = σ2s
∣∣∣hi,z h†i,si∥∥
∥h
†
i,si
∥
∥
∥
∣∣∣2 +
σ2n‖hi,zGi,si‖2 as
fWsi,z (x) =


(
1− PA(Ns−1)PI
)1−Ns(
PIe
x
PI
)−1[
1−
Ns−2∑
k=0
(
Ns−1
PA
− 1
PI
)k xk
k! e
−
(
Ns−1
PA
− 1
PI
)
x
]
µ 6= 1
Ns
,
xNs−1e
− x
PI
PI
Ns−1(Ns−1)!
µ = 1
Ns
.
(A.4)
Taking the expectation of Wsi,z by using
E
[
W
2
α
si,z
]
=
∫ ∞
0
x
2
α fWsi,z (x) dx, (A.5)
and substituting the derived expression of E
[
W
2
α
si,z
]
into (A.3),
we obtain (15).
APPENDIX B
A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
According to the SIR of the typical PU receiver in (2), we
define the sum interference at the typical PU receiver as
IPri,AN = Ip,p0 + P
−1
p Is,p0 , (B.1)
thus the CDF of γp
SIR
is expressed as
F
{p}
γ
p
SIR
(
γ
{p}
th
)
=EΦp
{
EΦs
{
Pr
{
|hp0 |2 ≤ γ{p}th IPri,ANrpα
∣∣∣
Φs,Φp
}}}
= 1− LIPri,AN
(
γ
{p}
th rp
α
) (B.2)
By utilizing similar approach in Appendix A of [34] and
based on Lemma 1, we derive the outage probability at the
typical PU receiver as
P
pri,AN
out
(
γ
{p}
th
)
=

1− exp
(
−pi(λpΓ (1 + 2α)+ λs(PsPp ) 2αΥ1)δ
)
µ 6= 1
Ns
,
1− exp
(
−pi(λpΓ (1 + 2α)+ λs(µPsPp ) 2α Γ(Ns+ 2α )Γ(Ns) )δ
)
µ = 1
Ns
.
(B.3)
where δ = Γ
(
1− 2
α
) (
γ
{p}
th
) 2
α rp
2
. By inversing (B.3), we
can derive the maximum permissive transmit power at the SU
transmitters as (18).
APPENDIX C
A PROOF OF LEMMA 2
The PDF and CDF of ‖h0,s0‖2 are given by
f‖h0,s0‖2 (x) =
xNs−1e−x
(Ns − 1)! , (C.1)
and
F‖h0,s0‖2 (x) = 1− e
−x
(Ns−1∑
m=0
xm
m!
)
, (C.2)
respectively.
Let us define ISec,AN = PpIp,s0 + Is,s0 .
12
Based on the SIR in (6), the CDF of γs,AN
SIR
can be
represented as
F
{s}
γ
s,AN
SIR
(
γ
{s}
th
)
= 1−
Ns−1∑
m=0
EΦp
{
EΦs
{∫ ∞
0
e−τγ
{s}
th
rαs σ
−2
s
(
τγ
{s}
th r
α
s σ
−2
s
)m
dPr
(
ISec,AN ≤ τ
)}} 1
m!
(a)
= 1−EΦp
{
EΦs
{∫ ∞
0
e−τγ
{s}
th
rαs σ
−2
s dPr
(
ISec,AN ≤ τ
)}}
−
Ns−1∑
m=1
(rαs )
m
m!(−1)mEΦp
{
EΦs
{∫ ∞
0
dm
(
e−τγ
{s}
th
xσ−2s
)
dxm
∣∣∣∣∣
x=rαs
dPr (ISec,AN ≤ τ )
}}
, (C.3)
where (a) follows from the fact that
dm(e−τγ
{s}
th
xσ−2s )
dxm
∣∣∣∣∣
x=rαs
= (−τγ{s}th σ−2s )me−τγ
{s}
th
rαs σ
−2
s .
(C.4)
After some manipulations, we have
F
{s}
γ
s,AN
SIR
(
γ
{s}
th
)
= 1− LISec,AN
(
γ
{s}
th r
α
s σ
−2
s
)
−
Ns−1∑
m=1
(
rαs
)m
m!
(−1)m
dm
{LISec,AN (γ{s}th xσ−2s )}
dxm
∣∣
x=rαs
.
(C.5)
We then need to derive the Laplace transform of ISec,AN .
Utilizing [34, eq. (4)] and Lemma 2, we obtain
LISec,AN
(
γ
{s}
th r
α
s σ
−2
s
)
= exp
(−Λl(γ{s}th ) 2α r2s), (C.6)
where Λl is given in (23).
Now, we apply the Faa` di Bruno’s formula to solve the
derivative of mth order as follows:
dm
[
exp
(−Λl(γ{s}th ) 2αx 2α )]
dxm
∣∣
x=rαs
= exp
(−Λl(γ{s}th ) 2α r2s)
∑
m!
m∏
j=1
((−Λl(γ{s}th )
2
α
)
j−1∏
k=0
( 2
α
− k)(rs)2−jα)
mj
mj !j!mj
.
(C.7)
By substituting (C.7) into (C.5), we get the closed-form
expression for the CDF of SIR at the typical secondary user
as (22).
APPENDIX D
A PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Let us define IEve,AN = PpIp,ek + Is,ek + σ2nIs0,ek,an.
The CDF of γe
SIR
can be written as
F
{e}
γ
e,AN
SIR
(
γ
{e}
th
)
= EΦe
{
EΦp
{
EΦs
{ ∏
ek∈Φe
Pr
{∣∣h0,e h†0,si∥∥h†0,si∥∥
∣∣2 ≤
σ−2s IEve,ANγ
{e}
th
∣∣Xek ∣∣α∣∣Φs,Φp,Φe}}}}. (D.1)
According to [47], h0,ek
h
†
0,si
‖h†0,si‖
is a zero-mean com-
plex Gaussian variable, which is independent of h†0,si , and∣∣h0,ek h†0,si‖h†0,si‖
∣∣2 follows the exponential distribution with unit
mean. Thus, the CDF of γe
SIR
can be represented as
F
{e}
γ
e,AN
SIR
(
γ
{e}
th
)
= EΦe
{ ∏
ek∈Φe
(
1−EΦp
{
EΦs
{∫ ∞
0
e−τσ
−2
s γ
{e}
th
∣∣Xek ∣∣αdPr (IEve,AN ≤ τ)}})}. (D.2)
According to the proof of Lemma 3.1 in [35], we express
(D.2) as
F
{e}
γ
e,AN
SIR
(
γth
)
=EΦe
{ ∏
ek∈Φe
(
1− LIEve,AN
(
σ−2s γ
{e}
th |Xek |α
))}
.
(D.3)
By using the Generating functional of HPPP Φe [36], we
solve (D.3) as
F
{e}
γ
e,AN
SIR
(γth) = exp
[
−λe ∫
R2
LIEve,AN
(
σ−2s γ
{e}
th |Xek |α
)
de
]
= exp
[
−2piλe
∫ ∞
0
LIEve,AN
(
σ−2s γ
{e}
th |Xek |α
) |Xek | d |Xek |].
(D.4)
Now we utilize [34, eq. (4)] and Lemma 2, we derive the
Laplace transform of IEve,AN as
LIEve,AN (s) =

exp
(
−pi(λpΓ(1 + 2α)η− 2αµ− 2α + λs Γ
(
Ns+
2
α
)
Γ
(
Ns
) )
Γ
(
1− 2
α
)(
γ
{e}
th
) 2
α
∣∣Xek ∣∣2)( 1−µ(
Ns−1
)
µ
γ
{e}
th + 1
)−(Ns−1)
µ = 1
Ns
,
exp
(
−pi(λpΓ (1 + 2α) η− 2α + λsΥ1)Γ (1− 2α)(
γ
{e}
th
) 2
α
µ−
2
α |Xek |2
)(
1−µ
(Ns−1)µ
γ
{e}
th + 1
)−(Ns−1)
µ 6= 1
Ns
.
(D.5)
By substituting (D.5) into (D.4), we obtain
F
{e}
γe
SIR
(
γ
{e}
th
)
=exp
[
−2piλe
( 1− µ(
Ns − 1
)
µ
γ
{e}
th + 1
)−(Ns−1)
∫ ∞
0
exp
(−Λl(γ{e}th ) 2α |Xek |2) |Xek | d |Xek |], (D.6)
where Λl is given in (23).
By applying [48, Eq. 3.326.2.10], we derive the CDF of
γ
e,AN
SIR
as (26).
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